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Abstract  
Economic  interests,  the  influence  of  economic  ideas  and  politics  have  been  put  forward  in  the 
literature as explanations for the British Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. In this paper, we will 
evaluate these competing explanations using the case of the liberalization of Belgian corn tariffs. The 
Belgian protectionist Corn Laws of 1834 were abolished in different steps between 1845 and 1873. 
The  first  part  of  this  paper  uses  quantitative  methods  to  assess  the  success  of  party  affiliation, 
personal  interests  and  the  economic  profile  of  the  constituencies  in  predicting  voting  behavior. 
Thanks to the detailed censuses of 1846 on agriculture, industry and population, it is possible to 
typify the economic make-up of the electoral districts in much more detail than in the British case. 
However, the analysis of roll-call voting proves that party affiliation and personal and constituency 
economic interests are insufficient to explain the shift towards free trade. The second part of the 
paper then discusses the role played by political strategy and ideas in the liberalization of corn tariffs, 
using a qualitative analysis of the debates on tariff policy. The large number of votes over a forty 
year period allows us to document the relationship between ideas and interests in a new way.  
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1. The British Repeal puzzle and the Belgian case 
The 1846 Repeal of the Corn Laws in Great Britain was a fascinating political event generating an 
impressive amount of historical and political studies.
3 The explanation of this famous episode of 
British political and economic history is still a moot point in present day literature on the subject. The 
Corn Laws were repealed in 1846 by a conservative government that was backed by a sound majority 
of  conservatives  and  aristocratic  landowners  in  Parliament.  Repeal  therefore  seemingly  eludes 
standard theoretical accounts of the formation of commercial policy, that puts political survival, 
pressure groups and the median voter at centre stage.
4  
Up to the 1980s much research interpreted Repeal as the result of the force of ideas. The quantitative 
analysis of Repeal by William Aydelotte in the 1960s proved that voting behavior in the House of 
Commons could not be explained by reference to personal pecuniary interests of the representatives.
5 
In the mind of different authors, Repeal was a clear case of the influence of ideas on economic policy 
formation. William Grampp pointed to the declaration of Parliament in 1820 which introduced free 
trade as the guiding principle of commercial policy. The subsequent changes in commercial policy 
were nothing more than the execution of that principle. According to Grampp both Tories and Whigs 
were convinced that free trade would increase per capita real income.
6 Charles Kindleberger, in turn, 
found that all European governments used free trade as a reaction to different stimuli between 1820 
and 1870, while after 1873 they all reacted differently to the same stimuli (the industrial crisis and 
the agricultural invasion). He therefore contended that around 1850 the countries of Europe “moved 
to free trade for ideological or perhaps better doctrinal reasons.”
7 Douglas Irwin maintained that 
                                                 
3 For a review of the secondary literature, see: Schonhardt-Bailey, “Introduction,” pp. 39-44 and Schonhardt-
Bailey, From the Corn Laws to Free Trade. 
4 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Magee, “Endogenous 
Protection: the Empirical Evidence,” pp. 526-561. 
5 Aydelotte, “The Country Gentlemen and the Repeal of the Corn Laws,” p. 51.  
6 Grampp, “Economic Opinion When Britain Turned to Free Trade,” p. 502 and Grampp, “How Britain Turned 
to Free Trade,” p. 86.  
7 Kindleberger, “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe,” pp. 31, 36 and 49-51 (citation on p. 51).    3 
since Prime Minister Robert Peel had a pivotal role in Repeal, his sympathy for political economy 
made economic ideas important for Repeal itself.
8  
The last twenty years have been marked by a renewed interest in Corn Law Repeal by political 
scientists using sophisticated statistical methods of roll-call analysis to evaluate an explanation of 
Repeal based on economic interests. Two authors working with this analytical tool have pointed to 
the  insufficiency  of  economic  interests.  In  1989  Timothy  McKeown  complemented  Aydelotte’s 
dataset with some independent variables on the economic  make-up of constituencies. McKeown 
concluded  that  rapid  economic  changes  created  a  situation  where  a  majority  could  be  found  in 
support of Corn Law abolition. But economic changes did not lead directly to changes in public 
policy, for the anti-protectionists consisted of Irish Repealers and Peelites, and neither had undergone 
drastic economic changes in the years before. McKeown thus points to broader political concerns 
playing their part in Repeal.
9 Like the previous author, Iain McLean and Camilla Bustani concluded 
from their roll-call analysis of 1846 that mainstream public choice is insufficient to explain Repeal. 
McLean and Bustani measured the influence of interests and ideology (defined as an attitude towards 
religion) on the voting behavior of the conservatives. They concluded that interests were important, 
but ideology was more important. They pointed in particular to the role of Peel, who had lost faith in 
the Corn Laws and used the Irish famine as a political strategy to change the Corn Laws issue from a 
purely economic one to politics.
10  
In a series of recent publications Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey regenerated an explanation of Repeal in 
terms of public choice. First, she rightly showed that the changes in British economic structure also 
influenced the stakes for the landowners. The capital portfolios of the landed elite were diversified by 
                                                 
8 Irwin, “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws,” pp. 41-59. 
9 McKeown, “The Politics of Corn Law Repeal and Theories of Commercial Policy,” pp. 353-380. 
10 McLean and Bustani, “Irish Potatoes and British Politics,” pp. 817-836 and McLean, “Rational Choice and 
the Victorian Voter,” pp. 496-515. Other authors also pointed to political factors in Repeal, notably the motive 
of institutional preservation and the leadership of Peel. See Kitson Clark, “The Repeal of the Corn Laws and 
the Politics of the Forties,” pp. 1-13 and Lusztig, “Solving Peel’s Puzzle,” pp. 393-408.   4 
investments  in  industry,  lessening  their  penchant  for  protectionism.
11  Next,  Schonhardt-Bailey 
attempted to measure the combined effects of interest, party affiliation and MPs’ personal ideology in 
a single model. Based on this analysis Schonhardt-Bailey presented the Conservative party as a 
coalition between two interest-based alliances, with a shared concern for retaining protectionism. 
Non-Peelite Conservatives mostly represented agricultural districts and had no incentive to follow 
Peel’s move for Repeal. The Peelites represented districts with comparatively more free-trade leaning 
interests. Before 1846, Peelites voted according to a general Conservative protectionist ideology, but 
in 1846 they were set free by Peel to follow the median voter of their district who was leaning 
towards free trade.
12 Thus it was not ideology that made Repeal possible, but rather the liberation 
from ideology. 
In  this  paper  we  evaluate  the  adequacy  of  economic  interests  to  explain  the  liberalization  of 
agricultural trade in the middle of the nineteenth century, using the Belgian case. The question is if 
economic changes necessarily lead to changes in economic policy, as Nobel prize winner George 
Joseph Stigler wrote: “If Cobden had spoken only Yiddish, and with a stammer, and Peel had been a 
narrow, stupid man, England would have moved toward free trade in grain as its agricultural classes 
declined  and  its  manufacturing  and  commercial  classes  grew.”
13  Specifically  for  the  Belgian 
situation after 1875, Swinnen et al. have analyzed the correlation between variations in prices and 
changes in agricultural protection.
14 For Swinnen et al., the mechanism connecting prices and tariffs 
remains a theoretical black box based on economic interests. It is exactly this black box that we want 
to open using data on the individual votes of Belgian representatives in the years 1834-1873. 
                                                 
11 Schonhardt-Bailey, “Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification, and Free Trade,” pp. 545-
569. 
12 Schonhardt-Bailey, “Linking Constituency Interests to Legislative Voting Behaviour,” pp. 115-117; 
Schonhardt-Bailey, “Ideology, Party and Interests in the British Parliament of 1841-47,” pp. 603-604 and 
Schonhardt-Bailey, From the Corn Laws to Free Trade. 
13 Stigler, The Economist as Preacher, p. 64. Cited in: Irwin, “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal,” p. 41. 
14 Swinnen, Banerjee and De Groter, “Economic development, institutional change, and the political economy 
of agricultural protection,” pp. 25-43.   5 
The Belgian case is interesting for three reasons. First, our analysis of Belgian roll-call votes is the 
first on the same subject and in the same timeframe as British Repeal. The comparison is justified 
because  Belgium  was  the  earliest  country  on  the  continent  affected  by  industrialization.  In  the 
regions of Mons, Charleroi and Liège coal mining and metallurgical industry flourished. In Verviers, 
which was called the Manchester of the continent, a mechanized woolens industry was established.
15 
The provisional results of the historical national accounting project show that the share of agriculture 
in GDP decreased from 30% in 1810 to 18% in 1870. The share of industry on the other hand 
increased from 16% to 40% in the same years.
16 The step to free trade in foodstuffs around 1850 then 
seems logical. The political scientist Pascale Delfosse indeed argued that the discussions on Belgian 
agricultural protectionism were the result of a clear-cut opposition between landed elites defending 
their interests in a rapidly changing economy and representatives of the new industrial and urban 
society.
17 
Second,  the  Belgian  case  is  interesting  because  of  the  detailed  data  available  on  the  economic 
background of the electoral districts. In 1846, the Belgian Central Statistical Bureau, led by the 
famous statistician Adolphe Quetelet, organized a census of population, agriculture and industry. 
This data allows for a much more precise economic characterization of the constituencies than in the 
British case.
18 Schonhardt-Bailey and McLean and Bustani had to use quantifications of broad verbal 
descriptions to characterize the economic profile of each constituency. McKeown had to settle for 
agricultural variables from the year 1866, twenty years after Repeal. Moreover, his data are often at 
                                                 
15 Van der Herten, Oris and Roegiers, Nijver België, pp. 31-32; Van der Wee and Veraghtert, “De economie 
van 1814 tot 1944,” pp. 184-192; Kurgan-Van Hentenrijk, “Industriële ontwikkeling,” pp. 34-42; De Keyser, 
“Brussel en zijn rand,” pp. 53-76. Oris, “Le contexte économique et social,” pp. 37-70. 
16 Horlings and Smits, “A Comparison of the Pattern of Growth and Structural Change,” p. 87. 
17 Delfosse’s analysis was based on the economic characteristics of the nine Belgian provinces. This method, 
however, does not allow for such clear conclusions about an opposition between the countryside and the 
industrial cities. Our paper works with the forty one electoral districts, which is more precise. Delfosse, La 
politique agricole de l’État belge; Delfosse, “État, crises alimentaires et modernisation de l’agriculture,” pp. 
71-95 and Delfosse, “La face cachée de l’unionisme,” pp. 117-146. 
18 On Quetelet read: Mosselmans, “Adolphe Quetelet, the Average Man,” pp. 565-582.   6 
county rather than at constituency level. Our detailed variables are gathered at the constituency level 
and are chronologically consistent. 
Finally, especially in the work of Schonhardt-Bailey, ideas become a specific factor next to interests 
and parties. They are seen as a residue, that which cannot be explained by public choice or party 
politics. But this residual collects all unobserved individual variation as well as measuring errors, and 
it seems inappropriate to label this as ideology or ideas. The Belgian case, in contrast, allows us to 
clearly establish (but not measure) the importance of economic ideas as a component of interests. 
This  is  more  in  line  with  literature  by  Keohane,  Goldstein,  Blyth  and  Jacobsen  on  the  relation 
between interests and ideas.
19 These authors point to the complexity of society and the resulting 
uncertainty  of  the  actors  about  the  right  policy  choices.  Interests  are  the  result  of  an  economic 
position mitigated by an interpretation of that position, which is colored by ideas. It is therefore 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate ideas from interests. The large number of roll-calls on the corn 
laws in Belgium and the extensive debates in Parliament between 1834 and 1873 make it possible to 
trace changes in the representatives’ perception regarding the economic interests of their districts. 
In section 2 we will first review the development of Belgian tariffs for corn between 1834 and the 
step to complete free trade in corn in 1873. In section 3 we will present the econometric analysis of 
representatives’ voting behavior. In section 4 we will point out the working of ideas in the evolution 
towards free trade. 
                                                 
19 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, pp. 4-5 and 112-113; Jacobsen, “Much Ado About 
Ideas,” p. 290; and Blyth, Great Transformations.   7 
2. From agricultural protection to free trade in Belgium, 1834-
1873 
20 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the yearly price averages of wheat, rye and potatoes for the period 
1830-1890, as well as the dates of the votes on the corn laws under consideration (dotted vertical 
lines).
21 From this figure it appears that the Belgian legislators did not simply react to price changes. 
The law of 22 February 1850 in particular is enigmatic because it buried the protectionist sliding 




Figure 1. Source: Gadisseur, Le produit physique, pp. 756-761. 
                                                 
20 For a full discussion of the legislation, read: Van Dijck, De wetenschap van de wetgever, chapter 8. In this 
article only the tariffs for corn are treated, but the analyzed laws also included tariffs for rye, spelt, oats, 
potatoes, macaroni, rice, beans, etc. The tariffs of these other foodstuffs were determined based on their value 
respective to that of corn. The laws after 1845 also included tariffs for livestock. 
21 The prices are not corrected for inflation since this was not an issue in the period under consideration. 
Segers, Economische groei en levensstandaard, pp. 341-345. 
22 Some older literature on agricultural tariffs exists, but these authors confined themselves to a, sometimes 
erroneous, factual overview of tariff legislation. Van Bocxlaer, “De afschaffing van de schaalwetten,” pp. 443-
444; Suetens, Histoire de la politique commerciale, pp. 61-62. Vander Vaeren, Les faits principaux de 
l’histoire de l’agriculture belge; Loridan, “Esquisse de la politique douanière,” pp. 319-323.    8 
After Belgian independence in 1830 the prices of wheat and rye started to fall because of good 
harvests,  sparking  demands  for  agricultural  protection.
23  The  protectionist  law  of  31  July  1834 
introduced a sliding scale inspired by the British Corn Law of 1828. As the prices of wheat and rye 
went down, a progressive import tariff would be levied. At a price of 19 Belgian frank (BEF) for 100 
kg the highest tariff of 7,5 BEF was levied (39% ad valorem). If the prices went under 15 BEF, 
imports became prohibited altogether. Above a certain threshold level imports were free. In the case 
of extremely high prices export became prohibited. The idea of the sliding scale law’s architects was 
to guarantee agricultural producers a minimum price that was considered as remunerative. In 1844 
the prices of wheat and rye once more descended to an alarming level, sparking calls for a more 
restrictive  protectionist  law.  In  February  1845  twenty-one  members  of  the  House  of  Commons 
introduced a bill that became known as the “Law of famine”. It had the intention of guaranteeing 
corn producers even higher prices than the 1834 law by introducing two new scales. 
However,  this  pinnacle  of  agricultural  protectionism  was  never  promulgated  because  of  the 
subsistence crisis of 1845-1848. The first reports on the failure of the potato crop became known in 
July  1845. The  next  year,  the  rye  harvest  failed. The  crisis  was  marked  by  the  continuation  of 
extremely  high  prices  until  1848  (see  figure  1)  causing  hardship  for  a  large  majority  of  the 
population. The outbreak of cholera in 1848 left many dead.
24 The government suspended the sliding 
scale law in September 1845. Temporary measures left the import of foodstuffs free until 1850. The 
yearly renewable measures also prohibited the export of foodstuffs between 1845 and 1848.  
After the end of the subsistence crisis, the temporary laws were replaced by the law of 22 February 
1850 that fixed the new agricultural tariffs for an indefinite period. The law was an important step 
towards free trade, but also showed many signs of a compromise. The genesis of the definitive law 
was  long  and  complex.  It  was  not  the  liberal  government  of  Charles  Rogier  that  pushed  for  a 
                                                 
23 Vandenpeereboom, Du gouvernement représentatif en Belgique, vol. 1, p. 144. 
24 For an overview of the subsistence crisis of 1845-1850, see: Jacquemyns, Histoire de la crise économique 
des Flandres and Vanhaute, “So Worthy an Example to Ireland,” pp. 123-148.   9 
definitive free trade law, although it did oppose the sliding scale.
25 When the prices began to descend 
at  the  end  of  1848,  Rogier  wanted  to  extend  the  temporary  measures,  officially  until  the 
consequences of British Repeal, which took effect in February 1849, became clear.
26 At the end of 
1849, Rogier proposed a new bill that prolonged the temporary measures for two years. However, by 
this time the prices of wheat and rye had once more descended to alarming levels that pushed the 
agricultural protectionists into action. The Parliamentary commission studying the bill argued that 
agriculture  should  receive  protection  as  long  as  industry  remained  guarded  from  competition.
27 
During the lengthy discussions in the House of Representatives that led to the law of 22 February 
1850, it was decided that this law would become definitive. The tariff for wheat was brought to 1 
BEF per 100 kg, the equivalent of a duty of 4,8% ad valorem for the average price of 1850. 
The law of 22 February 1850 can be characterized as a mixed triumph. It meant the end of the sliding 
scale of 1834 and is therefore the equivalent of British Repeal. Yet many representatives that had 
argued in favor of free trade during the discussions voted against the law because they thought that 
the tariff of 1 BEF was too high. Many protectionists also voted against because they hoped for the 
return of a protectionist sliding scale.  
Belgian agricultural tariff history becomes even more complicated as the “permanent” law of 1850 
did not last long. A new subsistence crisis struck between 1853 and 1857. Prices soared because of 
bad harvests from 1853 to 1855 and difficulties with the imports of foodstuffs during the Crimean 
War (1854-1856). Prices even rose above the level of 1845-1848.
28 The government reverted to the 
typical temporary crisis measures of free imports and export prohibition in yearly renewable laws. 
                                                 
25 When meeting Richard Cobden in Berlin on 29 July 1847, the Belgian ambassador Jean-Baptiste Nothomb, 
who was previously a cabinet minister, described Rogier as a free-trader. Cobden and Taylor, The European 
Diaries of Richard Cobden, pp. 165-166. 
26 “Denrées alimentaires. Exposé des motifs,” Parliamentary Documents of the House of Representatives, 7 
November 1848, nr. 12, pp. 56-57. All the references to Parliamentary proceedings and documents after 1845 
can be looked up on the website of the Belgian House of Representatives: www.dekamer.be.  
27 “Denrées alimentaires. Rapport fait, au nom de la section centrale, par M. Rousselle,” Parliamentary 
Documents of the House of Representatives, 11 December 1849, nr. 26, pp. 202-204. 
28 Delfosse, “État, crises alimentaires et modernisation de l’agriculture,” pp. 71-95 and “Denrées alimentaires. 
Exposé de motifs,” Parliamentary Documents of the House of Representatives, 15 November 1855, nr. 5, pp. 
49-55.   10 
The Catholic Prime Minister Pieter De Decker, a known free trade proponent,
29 moved for a new 
permanent law at the end of 1856. According to contemporary economists, the law of 5 February 
1857 inaugurated an era of free trade in Belgian corn tariffs.
30 The law left a tariff of 0,5 BEF for 100 
kg of wheat (1,7% ad valorem in the high prices of 1857).  
The law of 5 February 1857 functioned until a new period of high prices in 1871-1873. At that time a 
Catholic government removed all remaining duties on foodstuffs. The law of 2 January 1873 was 
accepted unanimously in the House of Representatives. 
3. An econometric analysis of representatives’ voting behavior 
Our  empirical  analysis  seeks  to  quantify  and  disentangle  the  relative  importance  of  personal 
economic  interests,  party  affiliation  and  the  economic  interests  of  the  constituency  for 
representatives’  votes  on  the  Belgian  corn  laws  in  the  period  1834-1873.  We  study  the  voting 
behavior on five laws: the sliding scale law of 1834, the law of famine of 1845, the Repeal law of 
1850, the law that lowered the tariff to 0,5 BEF in 1857 and the removal of all remaining tariffs in 
1873.
31 The first four roll-call votes will be analyzed quantitatively. Because the removal tariffs in 
1873 was unanimous, it is analyzed qualitatively in section 4. 
                                                 
29 De Hesselle, “Du mouvement libre échangiste en Belgique,” pp. 65-66. 
30 A. [Giovanni Arrivabene], “De la liberté du commerce des grains,” pp. 1-2. 
31 The text of the laws can be found in Pasinomie: collection complète des lois. Brussels: Bruylant 1789-. 1) 31 
July 1834, nr. 626, pp. 171-173. 2) 1845: this bill was never published. 3) 22 February 1850, nr. 91, p. 44. 4) 5 
February 1847, nr. 40, pp. 23-24. 5) 3 January 1873, nr. 3, p. 6.   11 
3.1 Data 
The votes of the MPs in the roll-call votes are collected in the published Parliamentary procedures.
32 
Only  effective  votes  are  considered  while  the  abstentions  are  disregarded.  Table  1  shows  the 
percentages of votes, party affiliation and personal interests in the votes under consideration. 
 
The  party  affiliations  of  the  MPs  were  collected  from  several  published  prosopographies  of the 
members of Belgian Parliament. This information has never been used for a quantitative analysis 
before.
35 Party formation in Belgium was mostly based on the opposition between Catholics and 
Liberals about the role of the church and religion in public life.
36 Party affiliation is represented by 
three dummy variables: “cath”, “lib” and “union”. The first two dummies stand for the respective 
attachment to the Catholic and Liberal party. “Union” stands for a political current of Unionists, 
which aimed at underlining the political unity of Belgium in the first years of independence. The 
current is of limited importance for our analysis (6 votes in 1834, 2 in 1845) and ceased to exist as 
                                                 
32 1) Vote on 21 July 1834: Moniteur Belge. 22 July 1834. 2) Vote on 7 May 1845: Chambre des 
Représentants. Annales Parlementaires (APC), p. 1632. 3) 9 February 1850: APC, p. 716. 4) 20 December 
1856: APC, p. 370-371. 5) 21 December 1872: APC, p. 260. 
33 The representatives from the constituencies Diekirch, Roermond, Maastricht and Luxembourg were omitted. 
These constituencies were a part of Belgian territory in 1834, but were transferred to the Netherlands by the 
Treaty of London (1839). We lack equivalent data to characterize these districts economically. Further, three 
representatives (from Mechelen, Leuven and Nivelles) were dropped because of missing data about their 
personal interests.  
34 One representative (de Meer de Moorsel from Aalst) was dropped because of missing data on personal 
interests. 
35 De Paepe and Raindorf-Gerard, Le Parlement belge and Van Molle, Het Belgisch Parlement. 
36 Witte, “The battle for monasteries, cemeteries and schools,” pp. 102-128 and De Smaele, “Les partis 
politiques à la Chambre,” pp. 131-157. 
Table 1 : Distribution of votes, party affiliation and personal interests 
Year  Votes  Party affiliation  Personal interests 
  Protectionist  Abstention  Liberalization  Liberal  Catholic  Union  Industry  Land  Mixed  Professions 
1834
33  66, 7%  0%  33,4%  35,4%  52,1%  12,5%  12,5%  25%  31,3%  31,3% 
1845
34  63,4%  0%  36,6%  42,4%  54,9%  2,8%  14,1%  14,1%  33,8%  38,0% 
1850  23,8%  11,3%  65%  72,5%  27,5%  0%  28,8%  15%  30%  26,3% 
1857  32,6%  19,8%  47,7%  44,2%  55,8%  0%  22,1%  22,19%  36,1%  18,6% 
1873  0%  4,5%  95,5%  34,3%  65,7%  0%  17,9%  20,9%  34,3%  27,6%   12 
tensions  between  Catholics  and  Liberals  mounted  in  the  1840s  and  1850s.  In  line  with  British 
literature  we  expect  Catholic  representatives  (conservatives)  to  be  more  in  favor  of  agricultural 
protection than the Liberals. 
Representatives’  personal  economic  interests  are  identified  by  the  already  mentioned 
prosopographies of Belgian Parliament, supplemented with biographical repertories on other (mostly 
local) political institutions.
37 The large landowners are found in the list of persons eligible for the 
Senate. This eligibility was conditional on a high minimal amount of taxes paid, which could in 
practice only be reached through land taxes.
38 Other biographical instruments were employed to find 
involvement in the industrial sector. The repertory of mandataries in boards of industrial companies 
was important in this respect.
39 The personal economic background of representatives is captured by 
four  mutually  exclusive  dummy  variables:  “perland”  indicates  eligibility  to  the  Senate  due  to 
landownership,  “perind”  indicates  presence  in  the  board  of  industrial  and  financial  companies, 
“perboth”  indicates  a  combination  of  landownership  and  interests  in  industrial  and  financial 
companies. As in Britain, portfolio diversification was a reality in Belgium, where industrial classes 
invested  in  property  and  landowners  invested  in  the  financial  and  industrial  sectors.
40  Finally, 
“perfree” indicates activity as lawyer, military officer, civil servant (before 1848), notary, doctor, 
journalist, university professor or engineer (with no large landownership or interests in industrial or 
financial  companies).  We  expect  landowners  to  be  more  in  favor  of  agricultural  protection  and 
industrialists to prefer free trade as this would allow for lower wages to guarantee subsistence of their 
workers.  
                                                 
37 Caulier-Mathy, Le monde des parlementaires liégeois; Lehoucq and Valcke, De fonteinen van de oranjeberg; 
Schepens, De Provincieraad van West-Vlaanderen vol. 1 and Heylen, De Nil and D’Hondt, Geschiedenis van 
de provincie Antwerpen, vol. II.  
38 Stengers, Index des éligibles au Sénat.  
39 Laureyssens, Industriële naamloze vennootschappen in België and Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, Dictionnaire des 
patrons en Belgique. 
40 De Belder, “Veranderingen in de sociaal-economische positie van de Belgische adel,” pp. 483-501.   13 
The constituencies are described economically and demographically by data for the year 1846.
41 The 
sources and definitions of all constituency variables are discussed extensively in the appendix. The 
population and industrial censuses of 1846 allow us to capture the urbanization (the share of the 
population  living  in  cities)  and  industrialization  of  the  constituencies.  The  general  demographic 
structure of the constituency is captured by its surface (“surface”) and population (“population”), the 
ratio  of  which  constitutes  the  population  density  (“popdensity”).  The  variables  “needyrel”  and 
“popcitrel” indicate respectively the percentage of the population living in cities and the percentage 
officially recognized as needy. The number of needy people is an indicator for poverty and potential 
political  instability  (food  riots).  The  industrial  capacity  of  the  constituencies  is  captured  by  the 
percentage of the population working in sectors where (private) firms employ on average more than 
100 persons (“indrel100”). The constituencies are typified electorally by the percentage of voters 
living in cities before the law of 12 March 1848 (“cityvoterel7”) and after the law of 12 March 1848 
(“cityvoterel8”). The law of 12 March 1848 lowered the amount of taxes payable to obtain voting 
rights, and was introduced to counteract democratic agitation after the Paris February Revolution of 
1848.
42 It increased the number of voters mainly in more urban constituencies and can thus be part of 
the explanation of the shift to free trade. The percentage of the population of each constituency 
having voting rights before and after the law of 12 March 1848 is represented by the variables 
“voterel7” and “voterel8”. 
We employ the agricultural census to identify the agricultural orientation of each constituency. We 
know the percentage of the agricultural surface used for growing wheat and rye (“wheatryerel”) and 
potatoes (“potatoerel”). We also know the number of “livestock” (dairy cows of more than 2 years 
old and pigs older than 2 months), the percentage of agricultural land owned by the farmers who 
work it (“propratio”, as opposed to leasing) and the percentage of farms working a surface of more 
                                                 
41 The economic and demographic structure did not change too much in slightly more than a decade before and 
after that date (votes analyzed quantitatively in 1834, 1845, 1850 and 1857). 
42 Witte, Craeybeckx and Meynen, Political History of Belgium, p. 43 and Van Eenoo, “De evolutie van de 
kieswetgeving in België,” p. 336.    14 
than 10 hectares (“surfmagn”). We expect representatives from constituencies with a specialization in 
wheat and rye production to be more in favor of agricultural protection. We also expect more support 
for protectionist measures where more land is leased by farmers, as large landowners would then 
lobby for protectionism to raise their incomes from leasing out land. The preference of districts 
specializing in livestock is harder to predict: as consumers of cereals they gain from lower cereal 
prices, but the laws under consideration in 1850 and 1857 also incorporated the tariffs for livestock. 
Table 2 depicts the summary statistics of these variables.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics Voting Districts (all 
districts weighted equally) 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
surface  71844  33772  28397  157110 
population  105785  69808  26707  376362 
popcitrel  21  11.8  0  48.4 
needyrel  21.1  10.7  2.04  42 
wheatryerel  19.8  10.5  1.63  38 
potatoerel  4.91  2.29  1.52  9.61 
livestock  26247  11612  9873  62539 
propratio  35.2  19.2  7.07  84.9 
surfmagn  9.35  4.43  2.61  23.2 
indrel100  1.43  2.93  0  12.5 
cityvoterel7  30.5  13.9  0  59.6 
cityvoterel8  33  16.7  0  68.2 
voterel7  1.11  0.247  0.74  2.1 
voterel8  1.7  0.344  1.06  2.59 
 
Additionally,  we  also  try  to  measure  the  influence  of  the  subsistence  crisis.  We  expect  that 
representatives from  constituencies  where the  subsistence  crisis struck  hard  were  more likely  to 
support  agricultural trade liberalization. The  subsistence  crisis  is  captured  by  a  dummy  variable 
(“potatocris”), which is 1 if the percentage of needy exceeds 25% of population and at least 4% of 
the agricultural land is used to grow potatoes. This dummy collects 14 of the 41 constituencies, 
grouped  in  two  geographical  clusters,  where  the  potato  crisis  was  most  severe:  East  and  West 
Flanders (Aalst, Bruges, Dendermonde, Diksmuide, Ieper, Kortrijk, Ostend, Oudenaarde, Roeselaere   15 
and Tielt; this cluster also includes Ath in the neighboring province of Hainaut) and a smaller region 
east of Brussels (Leuven, Nivelles and Borgworm).  






























































































































popdensity  1                    
popcitrel  0.45  1                  
cityvoterel7  0.41  0.93  1                
cityvoterel8  0.49  0.95  0.97  1              
needyrel  0.56  0.15  0.16  0.16  1            
wheatryerel  0.71  0.19  0.17  0.2  0.83  1          
potatoerel  0.76  0.38  0.3  0.36  0.52  0.67  1        
log(livestock)  0.26  0.31  0.27  0.39  0.08  0.24  0.32  1      
propratio  -0.6  -0.48  -0.47  -0.46  -0.67  -0.62  -0.5  -0.06  1    
surfmagn  -0.68  -0.06  -0.07  -0.15  -0.39  -0.51  -0.54  -0.37  0.27  1  
indrel100  0.25  -0.03  0.06  0.09  -0.15  0  -0.13  0.04  -0.02  -0.31  1 
 
Table 3 depicts the correlation matrix. Note how population density correlates positively with the 
percentage of the population living in cities and the orientation of agriculture towards cereal and 
potato production. More densely populated constituencies also tend to have a lesser share of land 
owned by the farmers and of farms working more than 10 hectares of land. The percentages of 
population and voters living in cities are almost perfectly correlated, so much so that we only employ 
the latter. The share of the population enrolled as needy is positively correlated with the importance 
of cereals and potatoes in the constituency’s agriculture, which is largely due to the year of the data 
collection in 1846, at the height of the subsistence crisis.    16 
3.2 General analysis 
After omitting nine abstentions in the 1850 vote and seventeen in the 1857 vote, the roll-call votes of 
1834, 1845, 1850 and 1857 can be analyzed as a binary variable.
43 We apply probit analysis to each 
vote separately to allow for maximal flexibility and account for differences in the content of the laws. 
General differences in historical circumstances are, as far as they are orthogonal to our variables, 
absorbed into the constants of the regressions. Table 4 presents the marginal effects, at the mean, of 
the probit regression. These marginal effects represent the change in the probability of a vote for 
trade liberalization due to a unit increase in the relevant variable (at the mean), while all other 
variables are kept constant at the mean. For dummy variables this unit increase is a dummy change of 
0 to 1 (i.e. the representative changing membership from the reference group to the group indicated 
by the dummy), and for logarithmic variables it concerns a 1% change.  
 
Table 4: Marginal Effects Probit Estimation (at mean) 
  Dependent variable: Vote pro trade liberalization 
   1834  1845  1850  1857  
perindus (d)  0.12  0.17  -0.020  0.41*** 
  (0.33)  (0.37)  (0.17)  (0.12)  
perfree (d)  0.30  0.17  0.089  0.24  
  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.13)  (0.19)  
perboth (d)  0.17  0.010  0.12  0.39*** 
  (0.39)  (0.29)  (0.12)  (0.14)  
lib (d)  0.60**  0.52***  0.77***  -0.11  
  (0.26)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.15)  
union (d)  0.41  0.25      
  (0.44)  (0.49)      
cityvoterel7/8  -0.0015  -0.022*  -0.0097  -0.029*** 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.0085) 
propratio  0.023**  0.0024  -0.0058  0.026*** 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.0058)  (0.0099)  
wheatryerel  -0.028*  -0.036**  -0.016*  -0.0026  
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.0085)  (0.013)  
                                                 
43 Since abstentions in 1850 and 1857 were motivated by disappointment with the reached compromise by both 
highly pro protection and pro liberalization representatives, it is inappropriate to include these abstentions as a 
single category in e.g. an ordered probit analysis.   17 
log(livestock)  -1.90*  -0.35  -0.80**  -1.29*** 
  (1.01)  (0.42)  (0.37)  (0.44)  
log(population) 2.11**  1.23**  0.30  1.71*** 
  (1.05)  (0.50)  (0.37)  (0.55)  
indrel100  -0.048  -0.037  -0.012  0.042  
  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.040)  
surfmagn  0.067  0.03  -0.048*  0.16*** 
  (0.055)  (0.037)  (0.025)  (0.059) 
potatocris(d)      -0.29    
      (0.25)    
N  48  71  71  69 
pseudo R-sq  0.59  0.56  0.4  0.4 
Marginal effects, Standard errors in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Personal economic background, captured by the first three variables, only affects voting in a way 
statistically different from zero in the 1857 vote. Representatives with industrial interests are, all 
other things being kept equal at the mean, 41% more likely to vote for liberalization in the 1857 vote 
than great landowners (39% if they are also great landowners). In the other votes, the statistical 
significance is smaller, but the sign of the effect of personal background is similar.
44 Party affiliation 
is, except for the 1857 vote in which both the Catholic and Liberal parties were divided, the most 
important variable in terms of size and statistical significance. All other things being kept constant at 
the mean, a Liberal representative was in 1834, 1845 and 1850 respectively 60%, 52% and 77% more 
likely to support agricultural trade liberalization than a Catholic representative. The few Unionist 
representatives were rather opposed to protectionism.  
As for the constituency background, as expected, the share of agricultural land owned by the farmers 
increases the probability of a vote for trade liberalization in a way statistically different from zero in 
                                                 
44 The fact that personal interests were not decisive is obvious since otherwise no agricultural free trade bill 
could have made it through the Senate, which was completely dominated by the landed interests. However, the 
bills of 1850, 1857 and 1873 did pass. Van Dijck maintains that the Senate, which was composed of rich 
landowners precisely to guarantee an independent reflection on the laws passed by the more democratic House 
of Representatives, could not vote against agricultural free trade because an overtly self-interested vote by the 
Senate would compromise this institution. Van Dijck, De wetenschap van de wetgever, p. 378.    18 
1834 and 1857. The relative importance of wheat and rye production and of the numbers of livestock 
increases the likelihood of a protectionist vote. The effects of industrialization and the potato crisis 
are not significantly different from zero. Surprisingly, the probability of a protectionist vote is higher 
if  a  greater  share  of  voters  (or  population)  lives  in  the  cities.  This  suggests  that  the  increased 
prominence of city voters due to the law of 12 March 1848 was not a factor in Belgium’s move 
towards  agricultural  trade  liberalization.  One  could  conjecture  that  representatives  of  the  more 
urbanized constituencies perceived the protectionism of the sliding scale as being in the best interests 
of their constituents, because rather than harming food supply it prevented production from being 
exported. The world market was not yet that developed, with imports and exports remaining limited 
until the 1870s. It was only after 1880 that the agricultural invasion became acutely felt (figure 2).
45 
 
Figure 2. Source: Gadisseur, Le produit physique, pp. 756-761 and Degrève, Le commerce extérieur, 
pp. 304-310. 
                                                 
45 O’Rourke, “The European Grain Invasion, 1870-1913,” pp. 775-801. Leen Van Molle has analysed the 
reaction of the Belgian government after 1884. Van Molle, Katholieken en landbouw.   19 
3.3 Additional analysis of the votes in 1850 and 1857 
As already mentioned, the vote on the law of 22 February 1850 was a compromise between the 
protectionists and the free traders that was not completely acceptable for all parties. A number of 
radical free trade supporters and protectionists rejected the compromise, influencing the results of our 
analysis of the 1850-vote. Therefore our analysis of 1850 is complemented here with a review of the 
votes on three amendments to the bill, during which the whole spectrum of preferences was served 
and a high number of representatives revealed their preference. On 2 February 1850 all present 
members of the House of Representatives voted for one of the three tariff options proposed by 
amendments representing the free trade (0,5 BEF), compromise (1 BEF) and protectionist position 
(1,5  BEF)  (respectively  2,4%,  4,8%  and  7,2%  expressed  ad  valorem  in  prices  of  1850).
46  The 
marginal effects at the mean of an ordered probit analysis of the votes on the amendments to the 
1850 bill are presented in table 5.  
Table 5: Marginal effects (at mean) ordered probit analysis 











perindus (d)  -0.32***  0.052  0.27*  
  (0.11)  (0.081)  (0.14)  
perfree (d)  -0.15  0.058  0.094  
  (0.13)  (0.043)  (0.10)  
perboth (d)  0.29*  -0.17  -0.12*  
  (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.064)  
lib (d)  -0.56***  0.37***  0.19*** 
   (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.061)  
cityvoterel8  0.0081  -0.0041  -0.0040  
  (0.0058)  (0.0035)  (0.0029)  
propratio  0.0041  -0.0021  -0.0020  
                                                 
46 APC, 2 February 1850, pp. 647-648. Preference for 1,5 BEF is the protectionist group; preference for 1 BEF, 
but not 1,5 BEF is the intermediate group; no vote on the last amendment of 0,5 BEF occurred because the 
tariff of 1 BEF was accepted, with help from some protectionists who preferred 1 BEF over 0,5 BEF. The 
representatives that voted against the 1,5 and 1 BEF tariffs are supposed to be in favor of free trade. This can be 
deduced from their interventions during the debates on the bill. For more background, see: Van Dijck, De 
wetenschap van de wetgever, p. 374-383.   20 
  (0.0053)  (0.0028)  (0.0027)  
log(livestock)  0.74**  -0.38  -0.37**  
  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.17)  
log(population) -1.54***  0.78**  0.76*** 
  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.24)  
wheatryerel  0.040***  -0.020**  -0.020*** 
  (0.011)  (0.0099)  (0.0069)  
indrel100  0.018  -0.0091  -0.0090  
  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.010)  
surfmagn  -0.056**  0.028  0.028**  
  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.013)  
Potatocris(d)  -0.085  0.039  0.046  
   (0.14)  (0.059)  (0.081)  
N  94     
pseudo R-sq  0.47     
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Contrary  to  the  vote  on  the  final  compromise,  personal  economic  background  did  affect  voting 
behavior on the amendments. All other things being kept constant at the mean, representatives with 
only industrial interests are 32% less likely to vote for the protectionist amendment and 27% more 
likely to prefer the 0,5 BEF amendment than the landowners. Representatives with a professional 
background  show  a  similar  but  less  outspoken  (not  statistically  different  from  0)  preference. 
Representatives with a mixed background in land and industry are significantly more likely than 
representatives with an exclusive landownership background to prefer the protectionist option. The 
importance of both the production of wheat and rye and of livestock in the constituencies still proves 
to  be  an  important  factor  in  predicting  preferences  for  the  protectionist  above  the  middle  and 
liberalization amendments. As before, party affiliation has the most outspoken and significant effect: 
Liberal representatives are 56% less likely to vote for the protectionist option, and respectively 37% 
and 19% more likely to vote for the middle and liberalization options than Catholic representatives. 
The ordered probit on the amendments allows one to conclude that the underlying variables still work   21 
in the same direction in 1850 as they did in 1834 and 1845. However, during the voting on the 
amendments in 1850 the representatives had more room to take their personal interests into account. 
This leaves, then, the vote in 1857 as an apparent enigma. The strongest variable of the previous 
years, party affiliation, stopped functioning in 1857. While political color fails to predict the votes of 
the  representatives,  the  effects  of  the  personal  economic  background  and  the  character  of  the 
constituencies become statistically much more robust than before (table 4). To explain these findings 
we need to point to the discussions on corn tariffs in the years immediately preceding 1857, when 
corn  prices  were  extremely  high  (figure  1).  The  protectionists  had  based  their  demands  for 
agricultural protection on the idea of justice, and not so much on any economic theory.
47 The leader 
of the protectionists during the 1850s, the Catholic Barthélemy Dumortier, was very explicit that he 
and his partisans always wanted to defend that part of the population that was suffering. During 
periods  of  high  prices  they  wanted  to  protect  the  consumers  with  free  imports  and  an  export 
prohibition.  Conversely,  when  prices  were  low  and  farmers  would  not  receive  the  price  they 
considered just, the protectionists wanted protectionist measures for the agricultural sector. By using 
this rhetoric Dumortier hoped to reinstate the sliding scale of 1834.
48  
But Prime Minister De Decker pushed for free trade in 1856/57 when the corn prices were still very 
high, explaining why the free trade law made it through Parliament. In these circumstances many 
protectionists could not oppose free imports because of their own discourse on the need to protect the 
consumer in times of high prices. The role played by De Decker somewhat resembles the actions of 
Peel.  De  Decker  was  a  leading  member  of  the  conservative  party,  but  had  opposed  previous 
protectionist legislation. The bill of De Decker completely split the Catholic and the Liberal parties 
during the vote. This political confusion generated a large number of abstentions (19,8% of all votes) 
                                                 
47 As is also remarked in the British context by Anna Gambles, Protection and Politics, p. 3. 
48 Dumortier, APC, 13 December 1855, p. 54. On this issue, see also: Delfosse, “État, crises alimentaires et 
modernisation de l’agriculture,” pp. 71-95.   22 
and allowed a significant number of representatives to follow their personal economic interest and 
the interests of their constituency. 
4. Interpretation of the unanimous 1873 vote 
In 1873 all remaining agricultural tariffs were removed. All representatives irrespective of their party 
affiliation  or  constituency  now  voted  for  free  trade  (leaving  3  abstentions  in  1873  outside  the 
analysis). After the 1850 vote, previous oppositions are on the wane. Table 6 shows that our strongest 
variable during the 1834, 1845 and 1850 votes, party affiliation, loses its force in 1857 and 1873. The 
number of abstentions in 1850 and 1857 is high, indicating an increasing hesitation on the part of 
both Liberals and Catholics about the right policy direction. The Liberals, who in general had a 
preference for trade liberalization, were extremely divided in 1857. In 1873 all Liberals were in favor 
of liberalization. More and more Catholics, who were outright protectionist in 1834 and 1845, began 
to defect to the free trade side starting in 1850. In 1873 all Catholics voted for free trade. How can 
we explain this development towards universal support for free trade in agricultural products?  
Table 6: Votes by party 
Party  Liberal Party  Catholic Party 
Year  Protectionist  Abstention  Liberalization  Protectionist  Abstention  Liberalization 
1834  7  0  11  24  0  3 
1845  9  0  21  36  0  4 
1850  10  3  45  9  6  7 
1857  12  7  19  16  10  22 
1873  0  2  21  0  1  43 
 
It is tempting to point to the previously mentioned rising share of the industrial sector in GDP. 
However, industrialization cannot explain the universal preference for free trade by 1873 because it 
was  geographically  concentrated  in  five  or  six  constituencies,  leaving  some  agricultural 
constituencies untouched until the last quarter of the century. In other districts, industrialization did   23 
occur, but remained limited to some islands in an immense agricultural sea.
49 Nor did the agricultural 
structure change much between 1850 and 1873: it remained largely traditional until 1880, when the 
agricultural invasion and the introduction of new technologies started a very slow transformation 
process that was only completed after World War II.
50  
What,  then,  can  explain these changes?  As  many  authors  have  argued  for  British  Repeal,  other 
factors outside interest based approaches have to be looked at. Here the econometric analysis needs 
to be supplemented once more with a qualitative analysis of the Parliamentary discussions and the 
press. Most importantly, we discuss the relationship of ideas to interests with reference to the votes 
over agricultural trade liberalization. By 1873 almost every representative, regardless of personal 
interest, party and constituency, was in favor of free trade. We cannot accept the proposition that all 
representatives voted against the perceived interests of themselves or their constituency.
51 Therefore, 
we must conclude that their perception of these interests had changed. All representatives came to 
think  that  free  trade  was  to  their  advantage  and  (more  importantly)  to  the  advantage  of  their 
constituency. This is a radically different approach from British research that makes a distinction 
between interests and ideas. In Belgium we see ideas driving a shift in the perception of interests.  
How did opinion shift? Like McLean and Bustani did for the UK, we argue that in Belgium, the 
subsistence crisis of 1845-1848 played a part in shaking up the old ideas. Previously Belgium, and 
Flanders in particular, was thought of as an advanced agricultural economy. The American Henry 
Colman,  who  visited  Europe  in  the  1840s,  was  impressed  by  Flemish  agriculture,  which  he 
considered to be the best in Europe.
52 Even King Leopold I remarked on the advanced state of 
agriculture in his 1843 speech before Parliament, two years before the subsistence crisis: “Belgium, 
                                                 
49 For instance in the constituency of Leuven: Heyrman and Peeters, “Doorbraak van de industriële 
samenleving,” pp. 137-171.  
50 Blomme, The Economic Development of Belgian Agriculture, p. 300. 
51 Another interpretation could be that the representatives stopped voting as delegates, representing the 
economic interests of their constituency, and began voting as trustees of the interests of the general public 
interest. However, this interpretation would still put ideas centre stage since the definition of the “interests of 
the nation” needs interpretation. On the difference between delegates and trustees, read Schonhardt-Bailey, 
“Ideology, Party and Interests in the British Parliament,” p. 582. 
52 Colman, De l’agriculture et de l’économie rurale en France, en Belgique, p. 211.   24 
so renowned for its agricultural progress.”
53 The subsistence crisis and the agricultural census of 
1846 changed this perception for many politicians. The conclusion of the census was, for its architect 
Adolphe  Quetelet,  absolutely  clear.  In  1847  he  published  an  official  report  stating  that  Belgian 
agriculture could not feed the growing population.
54 
Quetelet’s interpretation remained contested for ten more years, but the subsistence crisis sparked a 
search for solutions.
55 One of the proposed solutions was the free trade policy furthered by Adam 
Smith’s disciples. But it was not a vague idea floating in the air that changed opinion and policy. 
Liberal ideology was carried out by a powerful nation, the UK, and very vocal pressure groups. The 
Repeal of the Corn Laws in the UK changed the status of political economy. Before Repeal the idea 
of free trade was considered a theoretical chimera by many representatives in Belgium.
56 Once the 
economic  hegemon  of  the  time  chose  free  trade,  it  seemed  the  right  policy  on  the  way  to 
industrialization for the young Belgian nation.
57 The British Repeal inspired a number of Belgian 
economists backed by industrialists from the Verviers district to start a campaign for free trade.
58 The 
young engineer and economist Adolphe Le Hardy de Beaulieu formed the Association Belge pour la 
Liberté  Commerciale,  which  organized  meetings  in  Brussels  and  elsewhere  in  the  country  that 
resembled the actions of the British Anti-Corn Law League. The association was backed by a small, 
but very vocal, group of representatives to the House. Free trade economists, among whom the 
immigrated  Italian  Giovanni  Arrivabene,  infiltrated  the  Société  Centrale  d’Agriculture,  the  most 
prominent learned agricultural society, that counted many members of Parliament in its ranks. The 
                                                 
53 “La Belgique, si renommée par ses progrès agricoles.” Hymans, Histoire parlementaire de la Belgique. vol. 
2, p. 240. 
54 “Rapport de la commission centrale de statistique au ministre de l’intérieur, sur la situation des subsistances”, 
Bulletin Administratif. 26 November 1847, pp. 96-99.  
55 Van Dijck, De wetenschap van de wetgever, pp. 159-171. 
56 Speeches in the House of Representatives on 10 December 1831 by Pirson and Lardinois, Moniteur Belge, 
13 December 1831; On 18 April 1832 by Corbisier, A. Rodenbach and Osy, Moniteur Belge, 20 April 1832. 
57 Compare with scholarship on the possible motivation for UK Repeal based on international politics: Cain and 
Hopkins, “The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas,” pp. 463-490; James and Lake, “The Second 
Face of Hegemony,” pp. 1-29.  
58 Erreygers, “Economic Associations in Belgium,” pp. 91-108; Erreygers and Mosselmans, “Economists in the 
Belgian Parliament,” pp. 49-74; Van Dijck, De wetenschap van de wetgever, pp. 53-68 and 364-369.   25 
economist and journalist Gustave de Molinari commented continuously on Belgian economic policy 
in  his  journal  L’Économiste  Belge  (1855-1868).
59  These  economists  aimed  to  eliminate  all 
protectionist measures for agricultural and industrial products, and tried to forge ad hoc coalitions 
with agriculturalists, industrialists and the chambers of commerce to put pressure on the government. 
The opinion that Belgium was confronted with a structural shortage in food production became more 
difficult to deny for the protectionists when the new subsistence crisis of 1853-1857 again pushed 
prices to worrying heights (see figure 1). Food rioters once more attacked bakeries, corn merchants, 
and market places in large and provincial cities.
60 The influential Société Centrale d’Agriculture, 
which became free trade oriented in the second half of the 1850s, confirmed the structural character 
of the shortage in food production in 1854: “A sad truth, a truth full of menaces, is experienced by 
the people everyday. No one contests it, it is officially recognized. What the economists, who were 
thought  to  be  theorists  and  dreamers,  had  dared  to  proclaim,  is  now  proved  by  governmental 
statistics:  the  increase  of  the  production  of  foodstuffs  remains  behind  the  increase  of  the 
population.”
61 The most thorough analysis of the situation with references to the works of British 
political economists was written in 1855 by Edouard Ducpétiaux, a Catholic social scientist and 
general  inspector  of  the  Belgian  charitable  institutions.  Like  Quetelet,  he  was  a  member  of  the 
Central  Statistical  Commission  that  organized  the  censuses  in  1846.  He  estimated  the  average 
shortage in wheat production to be about one tenth of the harvest.
62 More and more representatives 
came to believe that the subsistence crisis had become endemic and that Belgian agriculture did not 
produce enough food, even in the case of good harvests, to feed the growing population.
63 In 1855 
                                                 
59 Van Dijck, “From Science to Popularization, and Back,” pp. 377-402. 
60 Deneckere, Sire, het volk mort, pp. 119-124. 
61 “Une triste vérité, une vérité pleine de menaces, est aujourd’hui acquise à l’expérience des peuples. Il n’est 
personne qui la conteste, elle est officiellement reconnue. Ce que des économistes, traités de théoriciens et de 
rêveurs avaient seul osé proclamer, les statistiques gouvernementales le prouvent. L’accroissement des 
subsistances n’est point en rapport avec l’accroissement des populations.” Speech of Max Le Docte on 14 May 
1854. Journal de la Société Centrale d’Agriculture 1 (1854): p. 151. 
62 Ducpétiaux, “Des subsistances, des salaires, et de l’accroissement de la population,” pp. 441-590. 
63 This can be found in different speeches published in the Annals of the House of Representatives (APC): 
Rogier, 26 November 1853, pp. 79-80; Moreau, 24 November 1854, pp. 137-138, 10 December 1855, pp. 185-  26 
Prime Minister Pieter De Decker acknowledged this as a fact.
64 The defense of protectionist corn 
tariffs became a difficult task in these circumstances, since free traders could depict tariffs as an 
unacceptable taxation on an already dear primary product.  
The  awareness  of  the  structural  shortage  in  corn  production,  British  Repeal,  the  actions  of  the 
Belgian economists and the strategic move of De Decker opened the way for free agricultural trade in 
Belgium. In the 1860s front-rank economists confirmed that the option for free trade had been the 
best policy choice for Belgium. Auguste Orts, a Liberal representative and professor of political 
economy at the University of Brussels, told his students that “The absolute liberty of trade has 
brought the results you can observe today”.
65 Emile de Laveleye, professor of political economy at 
the University of Liège, wrote that economic facts had proved that free trade was productive of 
prosperity. The British example was telling in his mind.
66 The example of the UK was ubiquitous in 
Belgium  in  these  years.  The  journal  L’Économiste  belge  contended  that  British  agriculture  had 
become the best in the world thanks to economic freedom.
67 The prominence of the British economy 
was also explicitly present in Parliament: “If England, which in the past recognized our superiority, 
has surpassed us today, this is because for a long time she has rejected the old doctrine of Protection 
and Subsidies.”
68  
                                                                                                                                                       
186 and 18 December 1856, pp. 342-343; Lesoinne, 25 November 1854, p. 151 and 13 December 1855, p. 219; 
Prévinaire, 13 December 1855, pp. 225-226; Mascart, 13 December 1855, pp. 220-221; Anspach, 16 December 
1856, p. 322; Frère-Orban, 18 December 1856, pp. 339-341; Delexhy, 17 and 18 December 1856, pp. 335-336 
and 341. 
64 “Circulaire du ministre de l’intérieur relative aux denrées alimentaires”, Pasinomie. 3 October 1855, nr. 589, 
pp. 323-324. 
65 “La liberté absolue dans le commerce a amené les résultats dont vous êtes aujourd’hui les témoins.” Cours 
d’économie politique professé à l’université de Bruxelles, General State Archives, Brussels, Papiers Orts, nr. 
386. 
66 De Laveleye, Études historiques et critiques, pp. 138-141. 
67 Estivant, “L’agriculture et l’État,” pp. 305-306. 
68 “Si l’Angleterre, qui jadis reconnaissait notre supériorité, nous a devancé aujourd’hui, c’est que depuis 
longtemps elle a rejeté la vieille doctrine de la Protection et des Subsides.” Vleminckx, APC, 19 January 1866, 
p. 219. In continental Europe British economic superiority was widely acknowledged. For France, read: 
Crouzet, De la supériorité de l’Angelterre sur la France.   27 
5. Conclusion 
It proves to be difficult to use models based on narrow economic interests to explain the step to free 
trade in corn in the middle of the nineteenth century. British Repeal of 1846 is a notorious example. 
Political scientists and economists studying Repeal have had a hard time making their models fit. 
Many authors pointed to other factors influencing Repeal: ideas, institutions and political strategy. 
Only Schonhardt-Bailey has succeeded in explaining Repeal using economic models of decision-
making.  But  in  order  to  make  her  interpretation  of  1846  work,  Schonhardt-Bailey  had  to 
acknowledge that the Corn Laws had survived votes in the immediate years before 1846 because of 
conservative ideology. 
The Belgian case adds to the evidence that interest based explanations of the liberalization of corn 
trade should not be taken at face value. The corn tariffs were a hotly debated issue in Belgian 
Parliament in the first three decades after independence. During these long discussions a protectionist 
policy was instated in 1834 and tightened in 1845. In 1850, after the subsistence crisis, the sliding 
scale was abolished. In 1857 the tariffs for corn were lowered to a purely “fiscal” level. After 1857, 
the discussions subsided and by 1873 all representatives had come to accept agricultural free trade. 
We conducted an econometric analysis of the roll-call votes on these tariff laws. Using biographical 
material and the 1846 censuses, we were able to construct detailed variables to measure the influence 
of  party  affiliation,  personal  pecuniary  interests  and  the  economic  characteristics  of  the 
constituencies. 
Personal interests of the representatives can only explain the direction of agricultural trade policy to a 
limited extent in the period under consideration. The economic characteristics of the constituencies 
partially explain tariff formation in 1834, 1845, 1850 and 1857. A constituency background with a 
high population, many leaseholders, and much cereal acreage and livestock increases the probability 
of a protectionist vote. Party affiliation is the most significant variable in 1834, 1845 and 1850. In   28 
those years a Catholic (conservative) party affiliation increases the probability of a protectionist vote. 
But this effect disappears in 1857 and in the unanimous 1873-vote. We therefore share the view of 
McKeown  and  McLean  and  Bustani  that  other  political  factors  and  ideas  should  be  taken  into 
account. The definition of the subsistence crisis in Malthusian terms, a structural shortage in food 
production,  made  the  protectionist  position  difficult  to  defend.  Economic  ideas  as  furthered  by 
economists and the successful example of Great Britain, pointed in the direction of free trade in corn 
as the best policy option. But also, political strategy comes into play as the timing of the vote on the 
1857-law was well chosen by Catholic Prime Minister De Decker, making his role comparable to 
that of Peel. 
This paper has chosen, contrary to research on British Repeal, not to model ideas in its econometric 
analysis.  Measuring  ideas  is famously  difficult  and  the choice to see ideas either as  an  attitude 
towards religion (McLean and Bustani) or as a residual (Schonhardt-Bailey) raises many questions. 
Following international political studies we think it is difficult to separate ideas from interests. An 
interest cannot always be simply deduced from social-economic facts, without references to the ideas 
the actor holds of his place within the economy. As complexity of modern society rises, rational 
agents do not possess all necessary information, and so interests are not self-evident. One needs an 
interpretative framework that guides self-interest. The long research perspective of this paper allows 
us to document that the interpretation of interests changed after 1857, leading to the unanimous 
1873-vote.  The  economic  characteristics  of  most  of  the  constituencies  did  not  change  radically 
between the highpoint of the discussions on corn tariffs (1834-1857) and the moment of the complete 
liberalization of these tariffs in 1873. It was therefore a shift in opinion underlying interests that 
needs to be taken into account.    29 
Appendix: Constituency variable description and sources 
Raw data series: 
￿  surface: surface of the voting district, in km² (Source: Exposé de la situation du 
Royaume. Brussels: Lesigne, 1852, Title II, p. 18) 
￿  population: total population of the voting district (Source: Population census of 1846: 
Population. Recensement général (15 octobre 1846). Brussels: Ministère de 
l’Intérieur, 1849, pp. 184-248)  
￿  popcity: total population in district living in cities (Population census of 1846, pp. 
184-248) 
￿  needy: total number of persons in district enrolled as needy in 1848 (Source: Exposé 
de la situation du Royaume, Title III, p. 252-261) 
￿  agrisurftot: total surface of district employed for agriculture in 1846 (Source: 
Agricultural census of 1846: Statistique de la Belgique: Agriculture. Recensement 
général 15 octobre 1846. 4 vol. Brussels: Lesigne, 1850) 
￿  surfwheat: total surface for growing wheat (Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surfrye: total surface for growing rye (Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surfpotatoes: total surface for growing potatoes (Agricultural census of 1846)  
￿  cows: total number of milch cows of more than 2 years old (Agricultural census of 
1846) 
￿  pigs: total number of pigs older than 2 months (Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surfprop: total surface of agricultural land owned by farmers (forests and wasteland 
excluded) (Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surflease: total surface of agricultural land leased to the farmers (forests and 
wasteland excluded) (Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surf1: number of agricultural enterprises working a surface less than 1 hectare 
(Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surf2: number of agricultural enterprises working a surface between 1 and 5 hectares 
(Agricultural census of 1846)   30 
￿  surf3: number of agricultural enterprises working a surface between 5 and 10 
hectares (Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surf4: number of agricultural enterprises working a surface between 10 and 20 
hectares (Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  surf5: number of agricultural enterprises working a surface of more than 20 hectares 
(Agricultural census of 1846) 
￿  indust100: total number of workers employed in sectors of on average more than 100 
workers per enterprise (Source: Industrial census of 1846. Statistique de la Belgique. 
Industrie. Recensement général (15 octobre 1846). Brussels: Ministère de l’Intérieur, 
1851) 
￿  voters47: number of voters in the district before the law of 12 March 1848, lowering 
the taxes payable to be able to vote to 20 florins (42,32 BEF) (Source: Exposé de la 
situation du Royaume, Title III, p. 16-19) 
￿  voterscity47: number of voters in the district living in cities before the law of 12 
March 1848 (Source: Exposé de la situation du Royaume, Title III, p. 16-19) 
￿  voter48: number of voters in the district after the law of 12 March 1848, lowering the 
“kies cijns” to 20 florins (42,32 BEF) (Source: Exposé de la situation du Royaume, 
Title III, p. 16-19) 
￿  votercity48 : number of voters in the district after the law of 12 March 1848 (Source: 
Exposé de la situation du Royaume, Title III, p. 16-19) 
 
Constructed variables:  
o  popdensity = population/surface 
o  popcitrel = 100*popcity/population 
o  needyrel = 100*needy/population 
o  wheatryerel = 100*(surfwheat+surfrye)/agrisurftot 
o  potatoerel = 100*surfpotatoes/agrisurftot 
o  propratio = 100*surfprop/(surfprop+surflease) 
o  indrel100 = 100*ind100/population 
o  cityvoterel7 = 100*voterscity47/ voters47 
o  cityvoterel8 = 100*votercity48/ voter48 
o  surfmagn = 100*(surf4+ surf5)/( surf1+ surf2+ surf3+ surf4+ surf5)   31 
o  livestock = cows+pigs 
o  potatocris=1 iff needyrel>25% and potatoerel>4% 
o  gen lnpop=ln( population) 
o  gen lnlivest= ln(livestock) 
o  gen voterel7=100*voters47/population 
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